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Executive Summary
This paper argues that drugs are expensive not because
of a lack of competition among research-based
pharmaceutical companies, but because of a lack of
competition in the drug approval process. Lack of
competition in the drug approval process has led to
exceedingly high drug development costs. High drug
development costs combined with artificially low drug
prices, obtained through price control legislation and
legislation that eases the entry of generic products into
the market, has caused lower levels of pharmaceutical
research and development, innovation, and economic
growth.
Estimates of the cost of developing a new drug show
that these costs continue to increase, despite the recent
efforts of regulatory agencies to speed up the drug-
approval process. Between the years 1963 and 1975, the
total cost of bringing a new drug to the market was
estimated at $119 million. Recent estimates put the cost
of having a drug approved at $802 million dollars. The
dramatic rise in drug development costs is mainly
explained by the increase in size and complexity of
clinical trials dictated by monopoly national regulatory
agencies.
We propose an alternative institutional arrangement for
drug approval, whereby private drug certification bodies
(DCBs) compete for assessment of the safety and
efficiency of new drugs, and also grant final drug
approval. The importance of reputation in maintaining
clients and attracting new ones, the existence of a free
press engaging in investigative journalism, and expected
penalties through the legal system for corrupt and
dangerous decisions by DCBs, should be sufficient to
establish a well-functioning market in drug approval.
Such a market in drug approval should also be effective
in bringing down the costs of drug innovation as well as
prices, just as privatization has lead to cost decreases,
lower prices and accelerated innovation in many other
sectors of the economy.
By way of analogy, we note that such a competitive
market in product approval has existed for centuries
among observant Jews that adhere to the laws of
Kashrut (kosher food). According to Jewish Law,
religious Jews are required to eat food that adheres to
certain standards that are verified for compliance by
religious authorities. Kashrut certification boards
(KCBs) have arisen that certify Kosher food products.
KCBs compete against one another and attract a
following based on reputation and trust. Religious Jews
can easily identify KCBs that adhere most closely to
their own personal preferences for stringency. There is
also a natural distribution of personal preferences for
stringency within the population of religious Jews, and
this distribution is reflected in the distribution of types
of KCBs that operate in the market.
DCBs could similarly thrive in a drug approval market
without an over-riding central regulatory agency. As in
the market for Kosher food, some individuals may want
an extremely safe medicine that was given approval by a
known conservative DCB. Others may be less risk averse
and would have the option of using a cheaper, “riskier”
medicine approved by a less stringent DCB. If
individuals were allowed to determine for themselves
the optimal amount of safety (or stringency) required,
according to their own preferences and budget
constraints, the distribution of types of DCBs arising in a
competitive drug approval market would likely reflect
this heterogeneity, and lead to increases in consumer
welfare.
As with KCBs, it is easy to imagine that DCBs, in a
vigorously competitive market, would find it optimal to
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build a history of good drug approvals and to develop a
trustworthy relationship with their consumers. A DCB
that bends to pressure from pharmaceutical companies,
and which is comprised of members who are “captured”
by pharmaceutical companies, would be quickly
exposed. The marketability of future products would
consequently suffer.
The existence of competing DCBs with no central
approval agency should also reduce the R&D costs
required to bring a new drug to market. Unnecessarily
stringent rules and procedures for clinical tests, dictated
by overly cautious central agencies, would be eliminated
along with bureaucratic inefficiencies. Innovations in
the drug approval process would accelerate.
Obtaining drugs at lower prices is a priority public policy
issue. However, ensuring continued pharmaceutical
innovation is also critical for increases in longevity,
better health, higher productivity and economic growth.
Balancing the price of medicine against incentives for
continued drug innovation is a difficult challenge facing
legislators. A promising solution to the drug-price
problem is to reform the regulatory drug approval
process through privatization and competition.
Legislators should give serious consideration to this idea,
The replacement of national drug administrations with
competing DCBs, with the power of final approval, could
substantially decrease the costs of drug development
without compromising public health. It would lead to
lower drug prices and preserve the incentives to
innovate.6
“The FDA has done enormous harm to the health of the American public by greatly
increasing the costs of pharmaceutical research, thereby reducing the supply of new and
effective drugs, and by delaying the approval of such drugs as survive the tortuous FDA
process.” 
Milton Friedman7
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I
Introduction
The price of pharmaceuticals is an issue of great concern
for governments around the world. Soaring national
health budgets and the fear that underprivileged
populations have only limited access to life-saving
medicines, have motivated policymakers to seek ways in
which they can intervene in the market for
pharmaceuticals. The most widespread solution that
governments have adopted for lowering the price of
pharmaceuticals is granting national regulatory
authorities the power to violate intellectual property
rights. National regulatory authorities usually permit
generic firms to rely on test data, generated and paid for
by innovators, in order to gain marketing authorization
for their competing products.
Generic firms need only show bio-equivalence of their
competing drugs in order to get marketing approval.
They do not need to incur the same level of costs as the
innovator in performing clinical trials. Generics can,
therefore, “free-ride” on the investment of the innovator
and charge a lower price upon expiration of the
innovator’s patent or period of data exclusivity.
Generic penetration into the drug market has been quite
successful in achieving the intended goal of lower drug
prices, however, government-sanctioned violations of
intellectual property rights also have their costs.
Although prices in the market for pharmaceuticals have
been lowered, the development costs that research-
based pharmaceutical companies incur have not been
reduced, thus harming the incentive for continued
innovation. Policymakers are gambling that the very
“visible” benefit of a lower current price for existing
pharmaceutical products will outweigh the much less-
visible social cost of future life-saving drugs never being
introduced to the market.
This paper argues that lower prices for pharmaceutical
products can be achieved without violating intellectual
property rights, and without damaging the incentive to
innovate. The regulatory approval process can be
reformed in a way that does not compromise public
health and that substantially reduces the costs incurred
by innovators in gaining marketing authorization for
their innovative products. Lower drug development costs
and prices could be achieved through replacement of
national drug administrations with competing drug
certification boards. Private drug certification boards
could compete on the basis of the safety, efficiency and
cost of their drug approval process.
Currently, national regulatory agencies are public bodies
that are far removed from the market forces of
competition and legal recourse. The incentives faced by
private certification boards for generating a track record
of good results are likely to be stronger in a competitive
certification market than the incentives faced by
employees of government agencies that are enjoying
relative insulation and monopoly powers (see also
Campbell (1997)).
The rest of this paper unfolds as follows. Section II
reviews the empirical evidence related to intellectual
property protection, profits and innovation in the
pharmaceutical industry. Section III describes in more
detail different types of intellectual property protection
and the role of generic competition. Section IV outlines
the current regulatory drug approval process and quotes
estimates of the increasing costs of drug approval.
Section V expands upon the idea of a competitive
market in drug certification among private certification
boards. Section VI concludes.8
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Intellectual property, profits and
innovation
New drugs are the fruit of long and costly research and
development (R&D).1 One of the most important factors
that supports continued investment in R&D in the
pharmaceutical industry is intellectual property
protection. A well-known study by Mansfield (1994)
arrives at this conclusion by surveying the R&D directors
of 100 U.S. firms between the years 1981 and 1983.
Respondents were asked to estimate the fraction of their
inventions that would not have been developed without
patent protection. The average fraction across all
industries was 14%, while in the pharmaceutical
industry it was 60% (see also Levin et. al. (1987) and
Cohen et. al. (1997)). Taylor and Silberston (1973)
found similar results in a survey of U.K. R&D-doing
firms. The data indicated that in the absence of patent
protection, the level of R&D investment would have
been 64% lower.
These pioneering studies of the role of intellectual
property rights (IPRs) in R&D activities, have raised the
question, why are IPRs so much more important in the
pharmaceutical industry relative to other industries?
Grabowsky (2002) provides a compelling answer. He
finds that IPRs are crucial in pharmaceutical innovation
because of the high cost of innovation relative to the
cost of imitation. Patent protection and data exclusivity
provide innovators with a period of market exclusivity
that allows them to recoup their large initial
investments and earn a profit. Without such protection,
innovative products would be quickly imitated at a very
low cost, rendering the original R&D effort worthless.2
Grabowsky and Vernon (2002) offer empirical evidence
on an important related point. They find that among the
118 new chemical entities (NCEs) introduced to the
market between 1990 and 1994, only 30% of them had a
present value of net revenue that exceeded their R&D
costs. For the median drug, the cost of R&D was not
recovered. It was only among the few high selling drugs,
known as blockbusters, that the return to R&D was
substantial (five times greater than the return to all
other drugs). This wide range of returns in new drug
investment led the authors to conclude that R&D effort
in the pharmaceutical industry is mainly driven by the
search for a blockbuster. In fact, research-based
pharmaceutical companies need to have some top selling
drugs in order to cross-subsidize other R&D
investments. Legislative enactments that weaken IPRs
and lower the price of blockbusters, without lowering
their costs of development, could cause a cascading
reduction in pharmaceutical innovation.
Giaccotto et al. (2003) provide empirical evidence for
this latter contention in the context of price controls.
They find that pharmaceutical R&D would be 30% lower
were the U.S government to introduce price limits on
drugs. Lowering R&D by 30% would result in 330 to 365
fewer new drugs within a twenty-year period. Price
controls are widely believed to have hurt the
competitiveness of pharmaceutical firms in Europe. Note
that in 1992, six out of ten best selling medicines were
manufactured in Europe, while in 2002 only 2 out of 10
were of European origin.
Although it seems quite clear that weaker IPRs and price
controls have the consequence of discouraging
pharmaceutical innovation, it is still legitimate to ask
just how costly less innovation is to current and future
generations. Current benefits in the form of lower prices
for already existing drugs could potentially outweigh the
social costs of lower pharmaceutical production in the
future.
On the lower price side of the equation, The U.S.
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) found that
consumers did indeed save a substantial amount ofReducing barriers to the development of high quality, low cost medicines
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money. Consumers of pharmaceuticals saved between 8
and $10 billion from 1990 to 1995 due to price
competition from the generic industry. At introduction,
generics sell, on average, at 61% of the brand name
price. After two years, as more generics enter the
market, generics sell, on average, at 37% of the original
brand name (see Grabowski and Vernon (2000)).
Importantly, however, the CBO study also found that the
U.S. Hatch-Waxman Act, which eased the entry of
generics into the drug market, had a significant negative
impact on R&D by research-based pharmaceutical
companies.
Lichtenberg (2002) directly assesses the social value of
innovation in the pharmaceutical industry. He finds that
pharmaceutical R&D and the introduction of new drugs
significantly impact the economy through increased
longevity, productivity and savings in other types of
medical expenses. New drug approval in a given year
increases the lifetime expectancy of people born that
year by .016 years. Aggregating this number over all
births in that year, as well as future births, yields a total
increase of 1.2 million life-years for each yearly drug
approval.
Lichtenberg estimates that for each extra dollar spent on
prescription drugs, $4.5 is gained through productivity
enhancement. Furthermore, each extra dollar spent on
drugs reduces other health related expenses by almost
$4. Importantly, there is a substantial rate of
depreciation in the value of old drugs implying that
future innovation is essential for the gains in health and
wealth to be sustainable.310
III
Intellectual property rights and generic
competition
IPRs in the pharmaceutical industry rely mainly on two
instruments, patents and data exclusivity. Patents are
usually given for 20 years from the day the patent is
accepted by the national patent office. For most
innovations, holding a patent is equivalent to holding a
marketing authorization and market exclusivity for a
certain period of time, until a newer, better alternative is
introduced. For NCEs, however, having a patent can be
quite disconnected from having marketing
authorization. In fact, it is ten years, on average, before a
newly patented medicine reaches the patient’s bedside.
After receiving a patent, the innovator must prove the
safety and efficiency of the new drug to the regulatory
authority.
In order to prove safety and efficiency of a new drug,
pre-clinical and clinical tests must be performed. The
results of tests on animals and humans are
systematically reported in the registration dossier
prepared for the regulatory authority. Because of the
large investment in money and time needed to
successfully gain marketing approval through clinical
trials, the data generated during testing phases is kept
confidential and cannot be exploited by potential
competitors for a certain number of years. This
protection is referred to as both data protection and data
exclusivity.
Data protection is an intellectual property right that is
distinct from a patent right. Some new drugs that are
not patented or have an expired patent can be protected
by data exclusivity. When data protection expires, a
competitor can rely on the safety and efficiency tests
performed by the innovator and in the possession of the
regulatory authority. If the competitor can show bio-
equivalence to the pioneer drug, no further tests are
required. The competitor, most often generic firms, can
then enter the market, saving millions of dollars in pre-
clinical and clinical trials. The significantly lower level of
investment needed for a generic to gain marketing
approval directly translates into a lower price for the
medicine.
It is important to note that because of the high costs in
time and money of gaining marketing approval from the
regulatory authority, and the contentious legal
environment surrounding patents, data exclusivity is
becoming the dominant IP tool in the pharmaceutical
industry. Increasingly stringent requirements for clinical
trials have reduced the patent life of innovative drugs.
According to the U.S. Federal Drug Administration
(FDA), the average patent life remaining after marketing
approval in 2001 was 7.8 years, instead of the original 20
years of patent protection. By contrast, other industrial
sectors enjoy an average patent life of more than 18.5
years.
The last ten years have also witnessed an increase in
legal patent disputes between generic and research-
based pharmaceutical companies. Generics have been
quite successful in challenging patents in the U.S. and in
Europe and have a strong incentive to do so. In the U.S.,
for example, the first generic to challenge a patent is
given 180 days of market exclusivity. According to the
U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC), generics have a
75% success rate in challenging patents.
For most drugs, patent protection goes beyond data
protection. However, if the testing period has been
extremely long, or if the drug does not have full patent
protection, data exclusivity can be the only form of IP.
For example, Eprex from Jancen Cilag and Arava
manufactured by Aventis had data protection beyond
patent life by one and two years, respectively (see
Pugatch (2004)). Taxol manufactured by Bristol-Myers
Squibb (BMS) is protected only by data exclusivity. BMS
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does not hold a patent since Taxol was licensed to BMS
from the U.S. National Cancer Institute.
Perhaps the most important U.S. legislation that altered
the role of patent protection and data exclusivity in the
pharmaceutical industry is the Hatch-Waxman Act. The
Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 granted generic companies
easier access to the drug market. The “Bolar” clause
derived from the Hatch-Waxman Act gave generics the
right to start testing bio-equivalency even before patent
expiration, so that generics can enter the market almost
immediately upon patent expiration.
The Hatch-Waxman Act did, however, also recognize the
need to further protect market exclusivity for research-
based pharmaceutical companies. The law restores part
of the patent life lost by innovators in the process of
obtaining marketing approval. The maximum patent life
allowed under the law is 14 years regardless of the time
spent on testing. A maximum of five years of patent life
can be restored. Vernon and Grabowsky (1996) find that
the average patent extension was 2.33 years for NCEs
introduced in the first half of the 1990’s.
A Federal Trade Commission study on the impact of the
Hatch-Waxman Act on competition between generics and
innovators found that since passage of the Act, generic
market share has grown from 19% in 1984 to 55% in
2004. It took an average of 19 months for generics to gain
marketing approval between 1984–1994, and the
probability of success in getting approval was very high.
For brand names whose patents expired between
1994–97, generics captured 64% of the market share
within a year, and 73% after two years. Prozac became a
typical example of fierce generic competition. One month
after generic introduction, the brand name lost 80% of its
market share.
It is important to note that a significant advantage that
generics have in the drug market, beyond the ability to
free-ride on test data generated by innovators, is that
they observe the marketability of innovative
pharmaceuticals and imitate only the successful ones.
This fact can be especially troublesome for the
profitability of R&D. As mentioned earlier, the profits














In Europe, an innovator can gain marketing approval
either at the European level, through the so-called
Centralized Procedure, or through national regulatory
agencies via the Decentralized Procedure. All approvals
at the European level allow the innovator to market the
product in all member states. This centralized procedure
is mandatory for all biotech products and optional for
other innovative products. At the European level, ten
years of data exclusivity is granted. Interestingly, this is
double the number of years of data protection offered in
the U.S.
In the Decentralized Procedure, products can also gain
marketing approval throughout the European Union via
the Mutual Recognition Procedure (MRP). In the MRP, a
marketing application is filed in a particular member
state, called the Reference Member State (RMS). After
gaining approval in the RMS, the innovator applies
through the MRP for marketing authorization in all
other member states. The approval to market the drug in
other member states is not automatic and a Concerned
Member State (CMS) can refuse marketing approval. In
2000, 36% of the drugs applying through the MRP did
not obtain approval in at least one CMS.4
In the Decentralized Procedure, the innovator is granted
data exclusivity that varies between six and ten years,
depending on the policy of each member state.5 The
period of data protection is essentially measured from
the first marketing authorization within the EU. When
data protection expires in the RMS, generic firms are
allowed to file for marketing approval in that state, and
through the MRP, they may gain marketing approval in
other member states in which data protection has notIPN WORKING PAPERS ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, INNOVATION AND HEALTH
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yet expired. Further, when data protection has expired
in a particular member state, applications by generics
will be accepted, even if the patent has not expired. The
patent holder is responsible for bringing an action for
infringement against the generic firm. These IPR rules in
the Decentralized Procedure have increased the
incentive of pharmaceutical companies to file marketing
applications in the biggest economies first.
With the enlargement of the EU in 2003, harmonization
of data protection standards among EU member states
caught the attention of policymakers. The EU Council
decided that the 10-year data exclusivity clause in the
Centralized Procedure could be further delayed by one
year if the innovator could show that the medicine is an
innovative treatment. For drugs registered in the
Decentralized Procedure, data exclusivity should be
eight years for all member states but could be
lengthened with an extra two years of market
exclusivity. This rule is often referred to as the 8+2
formula. Within the two extra years, generics would be
able to start the registration process, and launch their
product as soon as the patent expires. The 8+2 formula
was apparently motivated by the “Bolar” provision of
the U.S. Hatch-Waxman Act. The European Council is
hoping that these reforms will revive R&D activities of
the pharmaceutical industry in Europe.
Data exclusivity has also become a central issue in
international forums. In April 1994, the Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
agreement was signed by member states of the World
Trade Organization (WTO). Article 39.3 of the TRIPS
agreement states that, “Members, when requiring, as a
condition of approving the marketing of pharmaceutical or of
agricultural chemical entities, the submission of undisclosed test
or other data, the origination of which involves a considerable
effort, shall protect such data against unfair commercial use. In
addition, Members shall protect such data against disclosure,
except where necessary to protect the public, or unless steps are
taken to ensure that the data are protected against unfair
commercial use.”
The length of data exclusivity is not clearly announced
in the TRIPS agreement, and this lack of definition has
caused some signatories to almost totally ignore the data
protection clause. For example, TEVA, the premier Israeli
generic firm, continues to enjoy liberal access to data
produced by research-based pharmaceutical companies
in Israel. This lack of data protection has caused a
substantial reduction in R&D expenditures by research-
based pharmaceutical companies in Israel, and has
allowed TEVA to grow into one of the world’s largest
generics manufacturer.
Current government and supra-government intervention
in the pharmaceutical industry that legislates rules and
exceptions to data exclusivity, has given rise to a
complicated legal environment that continues to harm
innovation. Policymakers need to redirect their focus on
the determinants of development costs and its
relationship with the institutional structure of drug
approval. Lower development costs will lead to both
lower prices and more innovation.13
IV
The costs of the current drug approval
process
The U.S. market for medicine functioned without any
regulatory authority until 1938. The idea of a public
regulatory authority in the U.S. arose after the
appearance of a toxic drug on the market, elixir
Sulfanilamide, which killed 107 people. The
“thalidomide” affair in the 1960s, which led to fetal
deformation when used by some pregnant women,
induced the European Commission to adopt
standardized regulatory assessments to assure
equivalent national regulatory procedures.
The publicity surrounding the discovery of an unsafe
drug in the market leads to a legitimate public outcry
that engenders high political costs for national
regulatory authorities. The missed gains from new
medicines that are delayed or refused are more difficult
to discover, so government employees have an incentive
to err on the side of caution. This asymmetric situation
leads regulators to allocate too many resources to the
prevention of unsafe drugs. The desire to protect
consumers from harmful drugs has the unintended
consequence of raising the cost, and delaying or
preventing the approval of new drugs.
Regulatory authorities allow new medicines or vaccines
to be sold to the public only after extensive pre-clinical
and clinical trials are performed. These trials examine
the safety, quality and efficiency of the new drug in
curing diseases. The FDA (2002) estimates that it takes,
on average, 8.5 years to bring a drug to the patient’s
bedside. Other estimates are substantially higher.
DiMasi (1995) and Adams and Brantner (2003) estimate
the duration of new drug development to be 11 and 11.3
years, respectively. These latter estimates only consider
drugs that were eventually given marketing approval.
Dranove and Meltzer (1994) calculate an expected
duration, conditional on success, and find that it takes
13.5 years to develop a new medicine. 
The drug development process is, in general, composed
of four distinct stages. The first stage, pre-clinical tests,
is usually conducted before the innovator files an
Investigatory New Drug (IND) with the regulatory
authority. Pre-clinical tests include genetic analysis and
animal testing, and last 3.5 years, on average. Many
drugs fail during the first stage. According to the FDA
(2002), only one out of 1,000 drugs pass the pre-clinical
stage.
For the few drugs that pass the pre-clinical testing stage,
and review by the regulatory authority, the drug enters
human clinical trials, composed of three different phases
(I, II, and III). Phase I is carried out on a group of 20–80
healthy volunteers to primarily test the safety of the
product. Phase II includes several hundred patients
afflicted with the disease. Phase III is an extension of
Phase II on a larger number of patients, usually between
several hundred and a thousand.
Table 1 reports the average number of months spent in
each stage, and the probability of success.
As Table 1 shows, the probability of successfully moving
from one phase to the next is not monotonic. In the
later phases of development, the probability of success
Reducing barriers to the development of high quality, low cost medicines
Table 1 Duration and success rate for new chemical
drugs6
Pre- Phase Phase Phase Total
clinical I II III & FDA 
approval
Probability of 
success .1% 80.7% 57.7% 56.7% .03%
Successful duration 
(in months) 42 19.7 29.9 47 96.6IPN WORKING PAPERS ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, INNOVATION AND HEALTH
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decreases. It is interesting to note that the length of time
spent on development and the probability of success is
not a function of the size of the firm. The “big-
pharmas,” as measured by the number of drugs that the
firm has in development, do not have an advantage over
the “non-big pharmas.”7
After successful completion of clinical tests, the national
regulatory authority must approve the new drug. This
latter process lasts, on average, one year and a half. 
After gaining this last approval the new medicine can be
introduced to the market, although further post-
approval tests must be conducted to detect adverse
outcomes and long-term effects. In Europe, approved
new drugs are further delayed because of the existence
of government controlled health care systems. Each
government has to determine the reimbursement level
for each new drug, causing additional delays of several
months to several years.
The length of time it takes for new drugs to enter the
market, and the consequent cost to society of delays, is
an issue recognized by regulatory agencies. Concern for
delays has led to the passage of special legislation
intended to accelerate the process. In the 1990s, the FDA
adopted two new programs: “fast-track approval” which
expedites review of marketing approval for drugs
treating serious and life-threatening diseases, and
“accelerated approval” for products that provide
significant improvement over existing therapies.
Europe has also implemented similar programs. The
EAEMA implemented a target time of 210 days for
marketing approval of “orphan drugs” intended for the
cure of rare diseases. In 2003, the goal was reached with
an average approval time of 190 days. In addition,
“orphan drugs” were allowed to have smaller and
shorter clinical trials. In 1999, orphan drugs were
approved after testing on an average sample of 588
patients. Non-orphan drugs are tested on over 5,000
patients.
Although the measures adopted by regulatory
authorities in the U.S. and Europe, for a few selected
products, are commendable, much further progress in
shortening development times of new medicines is
required. R&D requires the payment of salaries, the
purchase of animals and expenses on equipment. The
firm must invest its own capital or borrow capital from
external sources in order to finance its R&D activities. In
either case, the length of time before commercialization
directly impacts on the financing cost component of
R&D activities through opportunity costs or payment of
interest. Shorter development times would directly
translate into lower costs and lower prices.
Note that the cost of developing a new drug has not
decreased over time but has rather dramatically
increased. An early study by Hansen (1979), using a
sample of NCEs entering human testing between the
years 1963 and 1975, found that the total cost of
bringing a new drug to the market is $119 million.
DiMasi et al. (1991) using a similar sample between the
1970 and 1982, found the total development cost to be
$231 million, representing a 94% increase in R&D costs
between the two cohorts. The Office of Technology
Assessment (1993) confirmed the figures reached in
these latter studies. The OTA explains the rapid rise in
R&D costs in the 1970s and 1980s by increases in labor
costs, the size of clinical trials and the costs of animals
used in pre-clinical testing.
A more recent study by DiMasi et al. (2003) uses a
random sample of 68 drugs, from 10 different
pharmaceutical firms, that entered clinical testing
between the years 1983 and 1994. This study uses a
similar methodology as earlier studies and finds that the
cost to the firm of having a drug approved is $802
million dollars (in 2000 dollars). Including the post-
approval cost of testing increases the figure to $897
million.
DiMasi et al. also broke down the costs by development
phase for their previous and current studies, and
estimated the allocation of R&D resources by testing
phase for the Hansen study. The results are summarized
in Figure 1.
The dramatic rise in the cost of developing a new drug is
mainly explained by the increase in size and complexity
of clinical trials and higher labor costs. According to data
compiled in the U.S. between the years 1981 and 2001,
the increase in trial size was 7.47% annually (see OTA
(1993), Peck (1997) and CMR (2000)). Further, clinical
trial complexity rose by 4.8% annually (DataEdge, LLC
(2002)). Labor costs rose because total R&D employmentReducing barriers to the development of high quality, low cost medicines
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increased, as did the average salaries for scientists and
researchers. The Bureau of Labor Statistics projects this
trend to continue over the next decade.
The exceedingly high and increasing costs of drug
development, combined with artificially low market
prices through price controls, and violations of
intellectual property rights, places privately initiated
drug innovation at risk. It is critical that policymakers
consider alternative institutional arrangements for drug
approval that can effectively bring down costs and
prices, while preserving the incentive to innovate.
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V
Toward a drug approval process based on
market principles
Drug approval in the U.S. can only be achieved through
the FDA. While the FDA is a pure public monopoly, the
European situation is quite different. The existence of
the MRP allows for a measure of competition between
national regulatory authorities. A pharmaceutical
company can choose the country in which to file for
drug approval. Licensing fees are paid only to the first
state that approves the new drug, creating an incentive
for regulatory agencies in different European countries
to compete. The UK, for example, streamlined its
regulatory requirements under the Thatcher government
and thus attracted pharmaceutical companies to seek
approval there.8 This competitive environment gave rise
to a convergence in approval times between countries.
Approval times decreased in the UK and Germany by
almost 70% (see Thomas et al. (1998)). The European
experience demonstrates that competition among
approval agencies can reduce approval times and
development costs.
The current European MRP, however, faces many
problems. For example, marketing approval is rarely
given in all European countries. From 1998 to 2001, the
number of Member States included in the MRP was, on
average, less than half (Feick (2002)). Concerned States
that do not receive fee payments have little incentive to
accelerate approval. It may even be in the interest of
Concerned States to delay approval, in the hope of
signaling to the market that the Reference State was
faster to approve, but fell short of insuring mutual
recognition. In fact, the Decentralized Procedure took six
months longer, on average, than the centralized
procedure in 1999. The main component of delay in the
MRP is disputes between national regulatory agencies.
The European CPMP that reviews disputes continues to
experience an increase in time to final decision.
The fact that mutual recognition has to be discussed and
approved at many bureaucratic levels slows the overall
approval process and does not foster a truly competitive
environment. Moreover, national regulatory agencies
still have an approval monopoly within the State. This
allows the agency to strategize against other national
agencies, delay approval times, and hold the citizens of
the country “hostage”. A truly competitive market in
drug approval among national regulatory agencies may
be difficult to establish. Further devolution of drug
approval to several (or many) competitive certification
bodies within each state is the first-best solution.
Note that the idea of competitive certification bodies is
not entirely new. For example, The Progress and
Freedom Foundation (PFF) developed a detailed
proposal along these lines in 1996. The PFF advanced
the idea of “Drug Certification Bodies” (DCBs) that
would work independently of central regulatory
agencies. A national board, similar to the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare
Organizations, would certify DCBs. In the PFF plan, the
responsibility of final drug approval remains with the
central regulatory agency. DCBs would compete in
offering drug approval services to their clients
(pharmaceutical companies) based on the speed of their
own approvals and their quality as measured by the
fraction that gain final approval from the central
regulatory agency.
The PFF plan shares many similarities with the
European MRP and would likely be an improvement
over that system. It is different from the MRP in that
one particular DCB could not prevent the marketing of a
drug within a country. There would be no monopoly
within a country. Although this plan would represent an
improvement upon the current European structure of
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monopolistic competition, it would fall short of full
potential. The incentives of the central regulatory agency
would still lead to an overly cautious approach to final
drug approval. With this problem in mind, the FPP
proposes the establishment of an independent
commission that would oversee disputes between DCBs
and the central regulatory authority. In other words, the
FPP proposes a variation on the European CPMP. This
latter aspect of the FPP proposal is its weakest link.
DCBs could be responsible not only for assessment of
safety and efficiency, but also for final approval. Thus,
there would be little need for a central agency with final
approval powers. The safety and efficiency of drugs
could be reliably determined as a result of market
mechanisms and legal recourse. The importance of
reputation in maintaining clients and attracting new
ones, the existence of a free press engaging in
investigative journalism, and expected penalties via the
legal system for corrupt and dangerous decisions by
DCBs, should be sufficient to establish a well-
functioning market in drug approval. A well-functioning
market in drug approval would be quite effective in
bringing down the costs of R&D and ultimately drug
prices, just as privatization has lead to cost decreases,
lower prices and accelerated innovation in many other
sectors of the economy.
By way of analogy, it is interesting that a competitive
market of this type for product approval has existed for
centuries among observant Jews that adhere to the laws
of Kashrut (kosher food). According to Jewish Law,
certain categories of food are forbidden, meat and dairy
products may not be mixed together, animals must be
slaughtered in a specific way and the meat soaked and
salted. Religious Jews are required to eat food that
adheres to these standards and has been verified by
religious authorities for compliance.
Violation of Jewish dietary restrictions may not lead to
physical death, but many adherents believe that non-
compliance will damage the soul. In order to aid
religious Jews in their compliance, Kashrut certification
boards (KCBs) have arisen that certify food products for
compliance with religious standards. KCBs compete
against one another and each board has its own easily
identifiable label. KCBs attract a following based on
reputation and trust. Moreover, religious Jews can easily
identify KCBs that adhere most closely to their own
personal preferences for stringency. There is a
distribution of personal preferences for stringency in
requirements within the population of religious Jews,
and this distribution is reflected in the distribution of
types of KCBs that operate in the market.
The sustainability of KCBs for hundreds of years,
spanning nations, is a good illustration of how DCBs
could thrive in the absence of an over-riding central
regulatory agency. Some individuals may want an
extremely safe medicine that was given approval by a
known conservative DCB. Others may be less risk averse
and would have the option of using a cheaper, “riskier”
medicine approved by a less stringent DCB.9
Individuals could determine the optimal amount of
safety according to their preferences and budget
constraints. The distribution of types of DCBs that
would arise in the market would reflect this
heterogeneity in the population and increase consumer
welfare. Religious Jews often consult with religious
leaders to choose which KCB most closely reflects their
preferences for stringency. Local physicians could serve
in an analogous capacity helping individuals navigate
between different DCBs. It is also reasonable to assume
that a market in information on DCBs would quickly
arise, easing access to information and fostering
transparency.
Note that KCBs have been very careful in maintaining
their reputations, and fraud has rarely been a problem in
that market. A KCB that misleads its consumers goes
out of business quickly.10 Today there are more than 100
KCBs as well as magazines that report changes in KCB
standards and possible corruption.
It is easy to imagine that DCBs, in a vigorously
competitive market, would likewise find it optimal to
build a good history of drug approval and to develop a
trustworthy relationship with consumers. A DCB that
bends to pressure from pharmaceutical companies, and
which is comprised of members who are “captured” by
pharmaceutical companies, would likely be quickly
exposed. The marketability of the pharmaceutical
companies future products would consequently suffer.IPN WORKING PAPERS ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, INNOVATION AND HEALTH
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The existence of competing DCBs with no central
approval agency would have a large depressing effect on
the costs of R&D required for the introduction of a new
drug. Unnecessarily stringent rules and procedures for
clinical tests, dictated by overly cautious central
agencies, would be eliminated along with bureaucratic
inefficiencies.
It is important to note that a significant decrease in R&D
costs could have an especially large impact on the
extensive margin. Currently, small biotech firms are
finding it difficult to raise sufficient funds to survive the
lengthy and costly drug development process. Fostering
the entry of biotech firms into the pharmaceutical
industry is important for both more innovation and
competition with traditional pharmaceutical firms. In
the U.S, 30% of all drug approvals in 2002 went to
biotech drugs.11 In 1999, they only represented 6%.
According to the European Commission, half of the new
medicine in development today is based on
biotechnology. A less costly drug approval process would
not only lower the costs and prices of NCEs but it would
also bring more players into the biotech market leading
to even more innovation, competition and cheaper
drugs.
The increased entry of small biotech firms into the
market could offset the waning of the generic industry
in the scenario of a competitive market in drug approval
that did not compromise intellectual property rights
through violations of data protection. In any case, fierce
competition among brand names already exists in the
industry. Lack of competition or concentration is not the
reason for high drug prices. DiMasi (2000) shows that
for new drugs that are substitutable with existing drugs,
the opening market price is very often lower. Out of 20
drugs examined during the 1995 to 1999 period, 13 of
them were launched at a lower price than the existing
drug, and five were introduced at the same price.
A competitive market in DCBs would completely
eliminate an economic justification for violating
intellectual property rights. Once the cost of developing
medicine and its price were sufficiently reduced, the
data generated by innovators in clinical trials could
safely become unrestricted private property. Another
benefit would be that there would no longer be a need
for legislating and re-legislating complicated data
exclusivity laws.
It should be mentioned that there are other arguments,
non-economic in nature, in favor of compromising data
protection. One argument rests on the consumer’s right
to know the test results. Ollila and Hamminki (1996)
make a case for more transparency in this regard. The
existence of DCBs would not totally resolve this
problem, but consumers would at least have the right to
choose which DCB to trust, and arguably have more
indirect knowledge of the reliability of a DCBs tests than
under a centralized regulatory system. The profitability
of the DCB would serve as a strong signal of the
reliability of their approvals.
Another non-economic argument against data exclusivity
is that it leads to the needless replication of testing,
especially on animals (see Dukes (1996)). However,
technological advancements may render animal testing
obsolete in the near future. Xgene Corporation is
pioneering a novel skin development technology that will
enable pharmaceutical compounds to be tested on skin
instead of animals. The pharmaceutical industry is also
aware of the ethical issue of using animals in pre-clinical
trials. In the UK alone, $477 million per year is spent on
developing new technology that could replace the need to
do animal-trials.
Conclusion
Obtaining drugs at lower prices is a priority public policy
issue. Ensuring continued pharmaceutical innovation is
also critical for increases in longevity, better health,
higher productivity and economic growth. Balancing the
price of medicine against incentives for continued drug
innovation is a difficult challenge facing legislators.
This paper argues that drugs are expensive not because
of a lack of competition among research-based
pharmaceutical companies, but because of a lack of
competition in the drug approval process. Permitting the
violation of intellectual property rights through weak
data protection laws and easy entry for generic products
is not the correct solution to the drug price problem.
Artificially low prices combined with exceedingly high
and ever-increasing drug development costs will lead toReducing barriers to the development of high quality, low cost medicines
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substantially lower levels of pharmaceutical R&D and
innovation.
A better solution to the drug price problem is to reform
the regulatory drug approval process through
privatization and competition. The replacement of
national drug administrations with competing drug
certification boards, with the power of final approval,
would decrease the costs of drug development without
compromising public health. It would lead to lower drug
prices and preserve the incentive to innovate.20
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Notes
1 R&D investment by pharmaceutical companies
amounted to more than $60 billion in 2003 in the U.S
and in Europe. The Association of the Pharmaceutical
Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA)
reported an estimated $33.2 billion on R&D
expenditures in 2003, The European Federation of
Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA)
reported R&D investment of 21.1 billion euros for the
same year.
2 Levin et. al (1987) argue that, in general, firms that
produce easily copyable goods, like pharmaceuticals,
chemicals, and software are generally more concerned
with IPRs than firms investing in products that are
costly or difficult to imitate, like computer hardware or
electronic assembly equipment.
3 According to calculations by Murphy and Topel (2002),
if medical research were to find a cure for cancer it
would be worth $47 trillion in economic value. Griliches
(1992) argues that R&D, in general, is the most
important factor explaining the growth of per capita
income and consumer welfare during the 20th century.
4 See IMS http://www.ims-global.com//insight/
news_story/0111/news_story_011106.htm
5 Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands,
Sweden and the United Kingdom have a ten year limit.
Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland and Luxemburg
have a six years limit. Greece, Spain and Portugal have a
6-year limit or until expiration of the patent, whichever
comes first.
6 Abrantes-Metz, R., Adams, C. and Metz A.
“Pharmaceutical Development Phases: A Duration
Analysis,“ Federal Trade Commission, Working Paper #
274.
7 Because of their novelty, fewer studies on duration and
probability of success have been conducted for biological
drugs. Biological drugs first appeared in the market in
1984, and by 1994, only 29 biological entities were
marketed in the U.S.
8 As a consequence, the Medicines Control Agency
(MCA) was able to raise half of its income from fees
charged to the pharmaceutical industry.
9 Note that AIDS groups are now lobbying for a
relaxation of drug approval requirements. See for
example the Gay Men’s Health Crisis (GMHC) at
http://www.aegis.com/pubs/gmhc/1996/GM100503.html
10 Many big food companies demand certification from
KCBs with the highest standards in order to appeal to
the largest number of potential consumers. 
11 This figure includes monoclonal antibody and
recombinant protein products. (SMD,rDNA and mAb
therapeutics).The current drug approval process is slow and costly.Moreover,
the disclosure of confidential data to national regulators,and the
subsequent use of this data to support regulatory approvals by
competitors,diminishes the incentive to innovate.As a result,
many potentially life-saving medicines are not developed and the
delivery of many more is unnecessarily delayed.
Activists complain that too few drugs are developed and the prices charged
for medicines excessive.Governments have typically used a heavy-handed
approach to such complaints,employing a combination of price controls
on medicines and public subsidies to drug development.However, these
policies do not address the underlying problem – indeed, they tend to
exacerbate it.
One solution to address part of the underlying problem would be to
enhance competition in the regulation of pharmaceuticals.The authors
argue that ideally this would happen through the privatization of existing
regulators,and open competition between private certification boards.
Such privatised regulators would set the standards of regulation at levels
demanded by those making choices about drug regimens.For many drugs,
this would mean swifter approvals and a reduction in development costs,
leading to an increase in the number of drugs developed for most diseases
– especially those which affect the poorest and those which affect smaller
populations – while also reducing the price of medicines to all.
In addition,under a privatised regulatory system it is likely that different
certification boards would target different groups. For example,some
might focus on the implications of drugs for specific populations,such 
as the elderly or children,while others might focus more on long-term
effects.As a result,doctors and consumers would be able to make more
informed choices about drug regimens.
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